legal foundations for physicians to give patients lethal injections upon request, for as we shall see, it held that hea lth care professio nals have a duty to help suffering patients find a quick and painless death if they desire it. It also appears that this decision will bring us a cycle of cases dealing with the provision of lethal injections upon request by health care professionals to chronically ill, handicapped and terminally ill patients.
In what follows , I would like to review the court's opinion and then comment on the case. In closing, suggestions for measures that could be taken to prevent the legalization of mercy killing by omission of morally required care and treatment or by positive action will be made . The court upheld Bouvia's right to refuse even life-sustaining feeding, and it even required the hospital to provide a substantia l part of her care, such as alleviating her pain and suffering. To den y her the treatments she requested would violate her constitutional right to privacy, according to this court:
Here Eli za beth Bou via's decision to forego medical treatment or life-support throu gh a mechanical mean s belongs to her. It is not a medical decision for her ph ys icia ns to make. Neither is it a lega l question whose soundness is t o be reso lved by lawyers or judges. It is not a conditional right subject to a pprova l by ethi cs co mmittees or co urts of law. It is a moral a nd philoso phical decis io n that , being a competen t adult, is hers a lone.
The court noted that Bouvia was unable to enter a private hospital because she was without mean s, and the hospital could not deny her relief from pain and suffering merely because she was refusing some treatments they wished to provide:
We d o not doubt the sincerity of [the hos pita l a nd medical personnel's] mora l a nd et hi ca l beli efs, or their sincere belief in the positi o n they have taken in thi s case. However, if th e right of th e pati ent to se lf-d etermination as to his own medica l treat ment is to ha ve an y mea ning at a ll , it must be paramount to the interests of the pat ient's hospital and d octors ... The right of a competent adult to refu se medica l trea tment is a constitutionally guaranteed right whi ch mu st not be abridged . 1o
The appellate court grounded its order to remove the feeding tube on the right to refuse medical treatments , and it construed this right very broadly:
The right to refuse medical treatment is basic a nd fundamental. It is recognized as a part of the right of privacy protected by bot h the sta te and federa l constitutions . . . Its exercise requires no one's a ppro va l. It is not merely one vote subj ect to being overridden by medical o pinion. "
In holding that this right to refuse even food and water is elemental, the court clearly meant that this right was not to be abridged, restricted or limited in any way. The primary authorities cited for this viewpoint were the cases of Barber v. Superior Court and Bartling v. Superior Court. 12 The court argued that the right to refuse treatments was not to be restricted , and even certain death res ulting from a refusal of treatment should not be a ll owed to impede its exercise:
A ll dec isions per mitting cessation of medica l trea tme nt or li fe -su pport procedures to so me degree hastened the arrival of dea th. In part, at least , thi s was permitted beca use the quality of life during the time remaining in those cases has bee n terribly diminished to th e po int of hopel ess ness, use less ness , unenjoya bilit y and frustration. She, as the patient , lying helpless ly in bed , unable to care for herse lf, may consider her existence mea ningless .13 The court argued in this manner, even though a number of other courts have differed with this judgment. In Brophy v. Massachusetts, for example, Judge David Kopelman argued that a purported declaration of a desire to refuse treatments should not be construed to mean that feeding should be withheld. 14 And In the Matter a/Claire Conroy, the New Jersey Supreme Court argued that feeding could only be removed from a terminally ill incompetent patient, but not from the competent and nonterminal. 15 The a ppellate court claimed that Bouvia had a right to live out her life with dignity and peace. 16 It suggested that her decision not to accept tube feeding was not a decision to commit suicide, but one to let nature take its course. 17 It suggested that she had wanted to co mmit suicide, but she failed to carry out that desire when she had the opportunity. Rather, it claimed that Bouvia was merely resigning herself to an early death , and was not trying to kill herself. 18 But this is highly doubtful , as her weight loss seemed to be due more to her refusal to eat than to difficulties she has in retaining foods. If this is true, then her rejection of the feeding tube would be suicida l, just as any refusal of oral feeding by her wou ld be suicidal as well. The court should have adopted a more protective course and held that feeding had to be given because her true intentions were unclear.
The court gave consideration to the possibility that Bouvia had an intention to commit suicide, but this motive was not to be permitted to inhibit the exercise of her right to refuse medical treatments. 19 The court simply dismissed assertions that the right to refuse medical treatments should be limited to those who are termina lly ill:
Moreover, as the Barrling decision hold s, there is no practical or logical reaso n to limit the exe rcise of this right to "terminal" patients. The right to refuse treatment does not need the sanction or appro va l by a ny legi slative act, directing how and when it sha ll be exercised .'o The court pointed out that there was no foundation for such a restriction, and it asserted that previous cases had placed no restrictions on the right of a patient to refuse medical treatments.2 1 The appellate court cited statements of the American Hospital Association , the Los Angeles County Medical Society and the President's Commission, among other sources, to justify its opinion, even though some sources such as the Commission did not explicitly consider whether the refusal of treatments could be permitted if suicide were to be a result of a treatment refusal. 22
The court did mention the recently announced opinion of the Judicial Council which held that feeding could only be removed from a comatose patient, and not from a competent patient like Bouvia. It also cited the opinion of the Judicial Council of the American Medical Association which declared that the physician was to sustain life and relieve suffering. 23 When neither of these are possible, then the choice of the family or legal representative of the incompetent person was to prevail. What this means in practice is that authorization from one of these to bring death by act or omission should be respected, as the physician is obviously not able to sustain life or relieve pain in those circumstances.
In a rather casual manner, the court rejected numerous arguments put forth by the hospital for providing Bouvia with assisted feeding. 24 The court rejected the view that there were limits to the right to refuse medical treatment because:
.. [a] competent adult pati ent has th e lega l right to refuse medical treatment .. The patient's interests and desires are the key ingred ients of the decision making process. 25
It rejected the argument that Bouvia had been admitted to a public facility and was therefore involving the state in her suicidal action which prohibited the hospital from cooperating in the suicidal act of rejecting life-sustaining medically providable food and fluids. 26 It rejected the view that she was not comatose or terminal and was truly trying to starve herself to death . It rejected the argument that she was asking for medical treatment which prohibited her from picking and choosing those treatments she wanted.27
The court also rejected arguments that there were state interests in preserving life, preventing suicide, protecting innocent third parties, and maintaining the ethical standards of the medical profession that could limit her right to refuse medical treatments. 28 To justify rejecting these claims, it relied on the Bartling and Barber cases, hich was a rather superficial way of dealing with the serious problems involved in this case.
The court acknowledged that Elizabeth Bouvia could live for 15 or 20 years if feeding was continued . 29 But it discounted the importance of this probability by arguing that the length of time a patient was expected to live was irrelevant to the right to refuse care such as the nasogastric feeding tube:
It is incongruous, if not monstrous , for medical practitioners to assert their right to preserve a life that someone else must live, or more accurately, endure, for " 15 to 20 years." We cannot conceive it to be the policy of this State to inflict such an ordeal upon anyone 30
The court agreed that the withdrawal of medical treatments usually hastened death, but it argued that the poor quality of Bouvia's life justified her decision to reject the feeding tube:
16
In Elizabeth Bouvia's view, the qua lity of her life has been diminished to the point of hopelessness, uselessness , unenjoyabiIity and frustration .. . Does it matter if it be 15 to 20 years, 15 to 20 months , or 15 to 20 days if such a life has been physically destroyed and its quality, dignity and purpose gone?"
It explicitly admitted that her decision to refuse the feeding tube was made out of a motive to bring death , but it denied that such a motive could be used to limit the right to refuse treatments.
The appellate panel decided that it was not necessary to define or dwell at length on what constituted suicide. It noted that aiding suicide was a crime, but it asserted that all cases of assisted suicide involved positive actions taken by individuals and these were different from the exercising of a constitutional right to refuse a form of care or treatment. 32 By pointing this out, the court seemed to be asserting that the withdrawing offood and fluids simply could not be considered as assisted suicide ul1der the law because it was a medical decision and not a positive act of killing. It noted that this was the teaching of the Barber and Bartling courts, as if these were the final authorities.
In many places, the appellate panel's decision appeared to be little more than pro-euthanasia propaganda. Judge Lynn Compton wrote a separate concurring opinion which was an outright endorsement of mercy killing and assisted suicide:
Eli zabeth apparently has made a conscious and informed choice that she prefers death to continued existence in her he lpless and , to her, intolerable condition. I believe she has an absol ute right to effectuate that decision. The state and the medical profession instead of frustrating her desire, should be attempting to relieve her suffering by permitting and in fact assisting her to die with ease and dignity. The fact that she is forced to suffer the ordeal of self-sta rvation to achieve her objective is in itself inhumane.
The right to die is an integral part of our right to control our own destinies so long as the rights of others are not affected. That right should , in my opinion, include the ability to enl ist ass istance from ot hers, including the medical profession in making death as painless and quick as possible.
That ability shou ld not be hampered by the state's threat to ' impose lega l sanctions on those who might be disposed to lend assistance.
The medical profession, freed of the threat of governmental or legal reprisal, would, I am sure, have no difficulty in accommodating an individual in Elizabeth's situation."
He concluded his opinion with the assertion that "[I]fthere is ever a time when we ought to be able to get the 'government off our backs' it is when we face death -either by choice or otherwise."34
II

Analysis of the Court's Holdings
There are distressing elements in this decision . First, the Bouvia decision has apparently denied the hospital and staff the right to be free from participation in the suicides of patients admitted to facilities where they serve. In this respect, the Bouvia court has gone far beyond what even the courts would permit in abortion cases, for the U.S. Supreme Court did not require that individuals participate in abortions against their consciences. If the Bouvia decision is allowed to stand, it would mean that health care professionals in public institutions could be released from their positions for refusing to participate in what they understand to be suicides. The ultimate implication of this decision is that public hospitals may, in fact, become state supported euthanasia centers.
Second, the court seemed to believe that there was no duty incumbent upon the state to take reasonable measures to prevent what appeared to be suicide. The court here explicitly granted Bouvia the right to commit suicide by refusing to be fed. This court has apparently renounced any obligations to prevent the seriously ill, handicapped or terminally ill from committing suicide. The appellate panel narrowly focused on the right to refuse medical treatments, and it did not give any consideration to the duty of health care professionals to take reasonable measures to prevent what they consider to be suicidal actions. The court has also ignored much of living will legislation which has excluded nutrition and fluids from the class of electable medical treatments.
Third, it is clear that the court has endorsed the "pure content less patient autonomy" model of the physician-patient relationship. This model holds that the physician is to abide by patient wishes irrespective of their content. 35 This model is very detrimental to health care professionals because it forces them to violate what they perceive to be their professional obligations and duties. This decision-making model is an overreaction to the "Golden Age" of medicine where the patient had few rights to reject a decision made about his or her care by the physician. Rather than endorsing this pure contentless patient autonomy model, the court should have endorsed the covenant model of the patient-physician relationship which would stress the mutual duties of health care professionals and patients in making medical decisions. 36 Rev . John R. Connery, S.J., has emphasized the notion that the issue at stake in these cases is the quality of treatment given to me' dically dependent and vulnerable persons and not the quality of their lives Y What he meant by this was that courts have a jurisprudential obligation to promote the highest quality care for medically dependent persons and that this consideration should dominate concerns for quality of life or privacy. The Bouvia court stressed the notion that medical decision-making was to be guided by the patient's wishes and desires , rather than by the canons of medical ethics or of high quality medical care. Rather than encouraging them to do that, according to Connery's views, legal decisions in these cases should have been concerned with mandating the highest quality care and treatment for one such as Bouvia.
Conclusion
The Bouvia decision will prove to be a landmark decision, drawing us closer to fully legalized mercy killing. Judge Compton's concurring opinion has established the legal foundation for lethal injections, and virtually any state court in the land could invoke his opinion to support a decision to give a lethal injection to a disabled person. This decision will have a profound impact on medically vulnerable and handicapped persons , for it will encourage them to follow Bouvia's example and order all care and treatment removed or withheld when they grow tired of their condition and suffering. Within the health care professions, it has undermined opposition to mercy killing by ordering public hospitals to participate against its stated policies in what it perceives to be a suicide.
This decision makes it clear that the strongest proponents of mercy killing will not tolerate the imposition of any limitations on those who wish to end their lives. They do not believe that assisted suicide should be denied anyone, and they clearly hold that it should be provided for those who are not terminally ill, but who consider their lives too painful and burdensome to continue.
To counter this movement and to prevent the legalization of suicide and mercy killing, it is necessary to remove life-sustaining medically providable nutrition and fluids from the legal class of medical treatments that can be declined by patients. If suicide by omission of life-sustaining medically providable food and water is to be legally prevented, it will be necessary to legally define these as aspects of normal, routine customary care and basic patient maintenance. 38 It is necessary to do this in order to preserve the right of patients to decline extraordinary and radically burdensome treatments, but to also require them to consent to care and treatments whose provision prevents their committing suicide.
It would also be wise to enact legislation at the state and federal levels which would require the provision of medically providable food and fluids to patients who are not able to take these orally except when their provision would hasten or cause death. This would prohibit refusal offood and water in situations where their rejection would be equivalent to suicide. Finally, it appears that it will soon be necessa~y to strengthen assisted suicide laws so that it would be considered a felony not only to aid, assist and abet suicide, but also to procure any instrument or potion for another person, knowing that it would be used for suicidal purposes. 39 With the emergence of the euthanasia movement at this time, we have seen our society come full circle from abortion. With legal endorsement of abortion, it became legal to perform directly lethal omissions or commissions against human life as it was entering the fullness of being. Now, with the rise of the euthanasia movement, many are contending that it should be legal to perform directly lethal omissions or commissions against life in its twilight. With the legalization of abortion, millions were killed simply because they were unborn . But with the dawn of euthanasia, we must fear that just as many will die because they are infirm, handicapped , terminally ill or too costly. (N.J. Super. A.D. 1983) at 313-4. 16. Bouvia v. Superior Court, supra. Ca I.App .2d . at 22. The majority opi ni on held:
Being competent she has the right to live out the remainder of her natural life in dignity and peace. It is precisely the aim and purpose of the many decisions upholding the withdrawal of life-support systems to accord and provide as large a measure of dignity, respect and comfort as possible to every patient for the remainder of his days, whatever be their number.
Id.
18. This judgment was disputed by Judge Lynn Compton in his concurring opinion : I have no doubt that Elizabeth Bouvia wants to die ; and if she had the full use of even one hand , could probably find a way to end her life -in a word -commit suicide. In order to seek the assistance which she needs in endi ng her life by the only means she sees available -starvation -she had to stultify her position before this court by disavowing her desire to end her life in such a fashion and proclaiming that she will eat all that she can physically tolerate. Even the majority opinion here must necessarily "dance" around the issue. Bouvia v. Superior Court, supra. CaI.App.2d, concurri ng opinion, Judge Lyn n Compton, at 2.
19. The court held that: Moreover, the trial court seriously erred by basing its decision on the "motives" behind Elizabeth Bouvia's decision to exercise her rights. If a right exists, it matters not what "motivates" its exercise. We find nothing in the law to suggest the right to refuse medical treatment may be exercised only if the patient's motives meet someone else's approval. It certainly is not illegal or immoral to prefer a natural, albeit sooner, death than a drugged life attached to a mechanical device. Bouvia v. Superior Court, supra. Ca l. App. 2d. at 24. 20. 21. The court, however, apparently referred only to the California cases of Bartling and Barber, but did not mention the land mark Quinlan or Conroy cases which restricted withdrawal of respiratory or nutritional and hydrational assistance to those who were terminall y ill. The Conroy decision explicitly limited removal of care and treatment to those who were terminally ill, and it was open to criticism by some for that judgment.
22. lei. at 14-17. 23 . lei. at 16-7. 24. lei. at 19-25 . The court never did explicitly address the issues of protecting innocent third parties or protecting the professional medical ethics, and it argued that the motive of desiring to commit suicide was not relevant to one's freedom to exercise the right to refuse medical treatment.
25. lei. at 9-1 O. These were quoted from Barber v. Superior COUrl, supra. CaI.App.2d. at 1019 -1020 . What the court failed to mention was that Elizabeth was med ically stable and that denying her food and fluids would be to introduce a new and independent lethal cause. Ordinarily, both the law and morality consider this to be killing, but the court did not give any consideration to this . 30. lei. at 20 , . lei. at 2-3 , Concurring opinion of Judge Lynn Compton. 34. Id. at 4. 35. The pure contentless pa tient model is a "quick fix" to a deeper problem of growing mistrust between health care professionals, patients and our nation's courts. This mistrust was generated in large part by the rise of the abortion movement over the past 20 years where many physicians abandoned life-saving for life-taking. It made many physicians into life-destroyers rather than healers, and this profoundly shook the prestige of hea lth care providers. Patients who had almost a blind confidence in physicians that they would always and everywhere preserve and promote life , came to distrust many of them , believing they had abandoned their classical professional ideals. But since then , American physicians became the only class of private citizens in our nation to have the legal power to destroy innocent unborn human life by their own authority. This virtually un limited power spawned a great deal of mistrust among patients, who retaliated with threats and act ions to make physicians pay for their negligence and malpractice as a way of ge'tting them to refrain from destroying life.
37. See Connery, S.J., John, "In the Matter of Claire Conroy", Linacre Quarterly , Vol. 52, No.4, November, 1985, pp. 324-5. 38 . It is necessary for this categorization because the law has the power to proh ibit competent and rational individuals from electing certain medical treatments for their own benefit. It is because of this that the law can prohibit competent and rational decisionmakers from taking laetrile which is an unproven medical treatment. The best way of protecting competent persons from committing suicide by rejecting life-sustaining and medically providable food and water is by placing these in the category of normal care along with other forms of patient maintenance as hygienic care, protection from exposure, psychological support and exercise. August, 1986 
